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Abstract 
In this study I examine whether balance sheet and income statement numbers have lost or regained 
their relevance over the last 30 years. Institutional and macroeconomic factors like the global trend 
towards strengthening regulation and harmonizing financial reporting, the extended use of fair values 
over historical cost, and the recurring occurrence of accounting scandals, market bubbles, and 
financial crises make it likely that the role of financial reporting for firm valuation has changed. 
Following prior research, I estimate four models for the concurrent relation between market value and 
accounting numbers, and then examine the pattern in explanatory power over time. I find that the loss 
in relevance of the income statement continues in recent years and is present in a large international 
sample, in particular in countries with strong institutions. While the overall relevance of the balance 
sheet remains stable, I find a downward trend during the first sample half, which reverses in the 
second half, especially in common law countries with strong investor protection, strict disclosure 
requirements and integrated markets. The results suggest that harmonizing accounting standards, 
rules, and regulation cannot completely overcome more generic differences in how firms utilize the 
discretion in the accounting system to communicate with outside stakeholders. 
JEL classification: G14, G15, G30, M41, M48 
Keywords: international accounting; valuation; fundamental analysis; regulation; market efficiency; 
IFRS; fair values 
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1. Introduction and outline 
1.1. Motivation 
Accounting information plays an important role in valuing economic transactions.  It is used to 
evaluate individual projects, business segments, entire firms, and equity or debt securities.  We can 
witness this vital function of the accounting system in various instances.  Exchange-listed firms 
frequently and regularly release voluminous financial statements containing hundreds of numbers, 
schedules, and other disclosures to support in valuation issues.  Financial institutions and brokerage 
houses spend large amounts hiring and retaining highly qualified financial analysts to assist in 
internal decision-making and customers’ portfolio choices.  Accounting standard setters view 
providing information that is useful for existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors to 
estimate the value of a reporting entity as a primary purpose of financial reporting (e.g., IASB 2010).  
Originating with Ball and Brown (1968), academics in accounting and finance have extensively 
studied the relation between capital markets and financial statements, creating a rich body of research 
on the value-relevance of accounting numbers, equity valuation and fundamental analysis, the 
processing of accounting information by market participants, etc. (for overviews see e.g., Kothari 
2001; Richardson, Tuna, and Wysocki 2010).  As an educator, every year on the first day of my 
introductory accounting class I emphasize the role of accounting for valuation, at our school we offer 
many specific class sessions or elective courses on this topic, and there exists a series of textbooks 
with a valuation perspective in mind. 
However, the importance of accounting information for valuation purposes is not uncontested.  
Concerns about the relevance of financial statements to investors, lenders, and other creditors are 
expressed, with different intensity, on a regular basis (e.g., Dopuch 1971; Levitt 1998; Francis and 
Schipper 1999).  The primary concerns are with regard to the content of financial statements (only a 
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small subset of the relevant information makes its way into the accounting system, and if so, it is not 
adequately measured), the timeliness of financial reporting (much of the information released via 
accounting system is already outdated once it comes out), and the inherent discretion in financial 
statements (managers can cook the numbers to pursue their own personal goals).  More recently, 
concerns about changes in the institutional and macroeconomic environment have been added to this 
list.  One the one hand, there are attempts to harmonize financial reporting, like the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in many countries around the globe, which 
proponents argue should increase the transparency and comparability of financial reporting (see e.g., 
Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki 2010 for an overview).  This goes along with an increasing reliance on fair 
value measurements, which under ideal conditions incorporate the investor perspective directly into 
the financial statements.  On the other hand, fair values are also a source of criticism because they are 
often difficult to obtain and might, on purpose or not, introduce volatility into the accounting system 
(e.g., Ball 2006).  In addition, financial reporting took a lot of blame during the rise and downfall of 
the dot-com boom in the late 90s, the series of corporate scandals shortly thereafter (e.g., Enron, 
Parmalat), or the global financial crisis.  Consequently, the role of accounting information for firm 
valuation is subject to an ongoing debate. 
1.2. Outline 
Against this backdrop, I discuss in this article whether the role of accounting information for 
firm valuation has fundamentally changed over the last 30 years.  In Section 2, I begin with a 
description of the conceptual underpinnings that relate a firm’s value to the accounting numbers it 
releases.  Based on a framework proposed by Beaver (1998), the connection between firm value and 
current accounting numbers flows through future expected cash flows via dividend discount model as 
well as future expected accounting earnings via expected payout ratios and fundamental analysis.  I 
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then tie this framework into the large body of research that examines the contemporaneous 
association between reported accounting numbers and stock prices and returns.  I conclude this 
section by highlighting two crucial assumptions underlying the relation between accounting numbers 
and firm value, namely that capital markets are informationally efficient and that information is not 
evenly distributed among firms and investors. 
Next, in Section 3, I briefly discuss three institutional and macroeconomic trends with the 
potential to affect the relation between accounting information and firm value: (i) the global trend 
towards harmonizing financial reporting, (ii) the extended use of fair values over historical cost, and 
(iii) the recurring occurrence of accounting scandals, market bubbles, and financial crises.  While the 
effect of the first two developments could go either way, i.e., improve or loosen the contemporaneous 
relation between accounting numbers and market values, the third rather questions the general 
suitability of the traditional accounting system to cope with today’s economic reality. 
In Section 4, I take these arguments to the data and examine the long-term trends in the 
explanatory power of accounting numbers for measures of market value in a large international 
sample over the 1981 to 2008 period.  More specifically, I show that the proportion explained by the 
income statement, either in a traditional levels and changes in earnings specification or a Basu 
(1997)-style reverse earnings relation, has continuously gone down and lost about a third of its 
explanatory power over the last 30 years.  At the same time, the explanatory power of total assets and 
liabilities and of a combined earnings and book value of equity model have remained stable, on 
average, but exhibit large variations over the years.  The balance sheet measures lost explanatory 
power in the first half of the sample, but regained it in the second half.  These results do not suggest a 
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general loss of relevance of accounting numbers, but indicate a shift in focus from the income 
statement to the balance sheet.1 
I then examine whether these trends in explanatory power vary by several institutional and 
macroeconomic factors.  For instance, using the distinction between countries legal tradition as in 
Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000), I show that in common law countries earnings lose their explanatory 
power more rapidly compared to code law countries, so that by the end of the sample period the two 
sets of countries are not distinguishable anymore.  The reverse holds for the balance sheet relation.  
Total assets and liabilities explain more of the variation in market values over time in common law 
countries, but I do not find evidence of such an upward trend in code law countries. The results 
obtain after including country fixed effects, effectively controlling for unobserved (time-invariant) 
heterogeneity across countries.  I find similar trends for other institutional factors.  Specifically, 
earnings become less relevant in countries with relatively strong disclosure requirements and more 
integrated markets, while the explanatory power of balance sheet numbers only increases in countries 
with integrated markets, strong disclosure requirements, and better legal protection of minority 
shareholders.2  These results illustrate that the role of accounting numbers for valuation purposes 
varies substantially (and systematically) with countries’ institutional context (e.g., Ball, Kothari, and 
Robin 2000; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006). 
Before proceeding, a few caveats are in order.  First, my tests examining trends in explanatory 
power over time show mere associations and do not speak to the underlying sources of the changes.  
Thus, while causality is elusive, the analyses indicate systematic variation over time.  This result by 
itself is important to better understand the relation between accounting numbers and firm value.  
                                                
1  This finding is in line with Francis and Schipper (1999) for a sample of U.S. firms over the years 1952 to 1994. 
2  When separately analyzing the U.S. economy, I do not find a distinguishable trend in the explanatory power of 
earnings, but a reduction (instead of an increase) in the relevance of balance sheet numbers. 
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Second, the tests allow no inferences about whether the explanatory power of accounting numbers is 
at a desirable level, or whether this number should be higher.  All I do is examine changes in this 
metric over time, and compare different institutional regimes in a relative sense.  Finally, I do not 
take side in the contentious debate about the relative dominance of the valuation role over other roles 
of the accounting system like stewardship or contracting.  I rather leave this discussion to others (e.g., 
Holthausen and Watts 2001; Kothari, Ramanna, and Skinner 2010) and, in line with Lambert (2010), 
argue that valuation is among the several important roles of a multi-attribute system such as 
accounting and therefore deserves its due attention. 
2. Conceptual underpinnings 
2.1. Framework for the use of accounting information in firm valuation 
To establish a conceptual relation between current firm value (measured as a firm’s stock price) 
and contemporaneous accounting information, we need to develop three separate but interrelated 
links (Beaver 1998): (i) the link between current stock prices and future expected cash flows, (ii) the 
link between future expected cash flows and future earnings, and (iii) the link between future 
earnings and earnings as realized (and reported) today.  In this framework, as depicted in stylized 
form in Figure 1, the primary role of accounting is to improve the third link, i.e., to help generating 
better estimates of future earnings via fundamental analysis. 
The first link builds on the assumption that the current value of the firm reflects the present value 
of all future cash inflows and outflow between the firm and its investors.  If we knew these cash 
flows with certainty, we could compute the market price of a security at any time by discounting the 
future payments with the risk-free rate.  Under uncertainty, we replace the certain future cash flows 
with their expected value and adjust the discount rate for risk.  The role of information and hence, 
among other things, financial reporting for this link is to alter investors’ beliefs about the input 
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parameters of the dividend discount model.  For instance, information about current earnings might 
alter the expectations with regard to a firm’s ability to pay dividends in the future and lead to an 
adjustment in stock prices. 
The second link stipulates a relation between future expected cash flows and future expected 
accounting earnings, for instance, in the form of an expected payout ratio.  Thus, accounting earnings 
must have some relation to dividend payments, which under the rules of accrual accounting by 
construction is the case, at least in the very long run.  That is, the distinction between accrual-based 
and cash-based accounting is that accruals can predate or follow cash payments, but that the 
difference will reverse over the course of the underlying economic transaction’s horizon.  Because we 
can neither observe future cash flows nor future earnings, the relation between the two measures is 
rather tenuous.3 
The third link relates future accounting earnings to current accounting earnings.  One can 
approach this relation from a rather methodological perspective and attempt to model the statistical 
time-series properties of earnings.  Alternatively, we can take other sources of information into 
account like financial analysts’ or management’s earnings forecasts.  Even more broadly, we can 
decompose earnings (or other aggregate accounting numbers) into its fundamental components.  For 
instance, operating income is the difference between sales revenues and the costs of goods sold.  
Revenues reflect future quantities and sales prices, which in turn vary depending on a firm’s product 
portfolio, marketing strategy, customer base, the competition in an industry, etc.  The costs of goods 
sold are affected by economies of scale and scope, prices in the raw material markets, technological 
development, the regulation of labor markets, etc.  This approach necessitates a fundamental analysis 
                                                
3  The residual income valuation model (Feltham and Ohlson 1995; Ohlson 1995) formalizes the link between expected 
future earnings and dividends by assuming clean surplus accounting thereby directly tying current book values and 
future accounting earnings to the current value of the firm. 
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of accounting information, by means of which investors hope to come up with a better (i.e., less risky 
or more accurate) idea of future expected earnings with the purpose of identifying mispriced 
securities.  Note that in such a fundamental analysis, financial reporting is but one source of 
information, albeit arguably an important one. 
2.2. Contemporaneous association between accounting information and firm value 
With these three links in mind, current accounting earnings and current firm values are 
conceptually related, and reported accounting numbers contain information relevant for equity 
valuation.  This gives rise to the so-called association or value-relevance studies (see e.g., Francis and 
Schipper 1999; Holthausen and Watts 2001; Kothari 2001), which test for a contemporaneous 
positive correlation between accounting numbers and measures of market value.  Because investors 
have access to a multitude of information sources aside from financial disclosures that provide 
information in a more timely manner and in ways not feasible for the accounting system (i.e., subject 
to high uncertainty, relying on future instead of past transactions, and difficult to measure), we cannot 
infer causality from such association studies.  Rather they tell us whether and how quickly 
information reflected in security prices finds its way into the accounting system.  Put differently, a 
positive association is indicative of some underlying common factor (presumably the economics of 
the firm via the three links outlined above) that ties accounting numbers to current firm values. 
Association studies take on different formats.  In their most basic form they relate the market 
value of equity (as the dependent variable) to the book value of equity (as the independent variable) 
or some derivative (e.g., total assets and total liabilities).  Alternatively, the change in market value is 
correlated to the change in book value or earnings.  The underlying assumption here is that in an 
efficient market security prices only move if new information is released.  Thus, in a changes 
specification the level and year-to-year changes in earnings are often used to proxy for the 
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unexpected component of firm-specific information contained in the financial statements.  To 
evaluate the value relevance of an accounting system, researchers consider the explanatory power 
(adjusted R2) of accounting numbers for the measures of market value, and then identify a loss (gain) 
of relevance as decrease (increase) in explanatory power over time, or compare the explanatory 
power across different accounting regimes (e.g., Alford et al. 1993; Francis and Shipper 1999). 
In another way to get at the same issue, but based on the insight that accounting numbers 
systematically lag behind changes in economic income, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) estimate a 
Basu (1997)-style regression that relates earnings (as the dependent variable) to returns (as the 
independent variable) and allow this relation to vary between positive and negative returns.  They 
interpret the adjusted R2 from this regression as a measure of timeliness that indicates how quickly 
accounting earnings incorporate changes in economic income.  They then use the timeliness measure 
to evaluate accounting systems across legal systems, countries, and over time. 
All the association studies have in common that they only allow relative statements, assume that 
market values are valid proxies for firms’ true economics, do not identify the exact means of how 
information from the accounting system affects investors’ common beliefs, are potentially subject to 
correlated omitted variables like changes in the institutional environment affecting both the price 
formation process as well as how information is represented in the accounting system, and disregard 
the many other uses of accounting information not directly tied to equity valuation. 
2.3. Market efficiency and unequal information among firms and investors 
The valuation function of accounting implicitly assumes efficient capital markets.  That is, stock 
prices should reflect the underlying true economic performance and value of the firm in a timely and 
unbiased manner, and incorporate all available information as soon as it comes out.  As such, stock 
prices can serve as proxy for economic income and objective benchmark to evaluate the relevance of 
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accounting systems in the time-series and the cross-section.  At the same time and somewhat 
counterintuitively, one of the purported goals of fundamental analysis is to identify mispriced 
securities, for which the current stock price is either too low or too high compared with the firm’s 
fundamentals.  This idea led to the detection of accounting-based or accrual-based anomalies (Sloan 
1996) suggesting that not all information provided by the accounting system is processed efficiently 
and immediately reflected in security prices.  Moreover, the degree of mispricing seems to vary 
across countries and over time (e.g., Pincus, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam 2007; Green, Hand, and 
Soliman 2011).  Evidence of market mispricing can impede the interpretation of association studies, 
in particular if the mispricing correlates with the dimension under study (e.g., across certain 
institutional features like insider trading in a cross-country context). 
A second important feature of the information environment affecting the use and interpretation 
of financial reports is the unequal distribution of information between firms and investors and among 
investors (see e.g., Verrecchia 2001 for an overview).  Often we cannot simply take information as 
given (i.e., a new piece of information is released and all investors update their priors accordingly), 
but have to consider the underlying incentives of the managers releasing the information for proper 
interpretation.  Because the incentives of those producing the information are not necessarily aligned 
with the users of the information, we might face an adverse selection problem (ex ante) and a moral 
hazard issue (ex post).  For instance, when trying to raise external capital, management has incentives 
to overstate favorable news and to hide unfavorable news so that the proceeds from the offering are 
maximized.  Once the securities are issued, management might be tempted to increase their share of 
the firm cash flows (e.g., in the form of higher compensation or via other financial and nonfinancial 
perks) at the expense of the outside investors.  In turn, investors will preempt these actions, and 
adjust their behavior accordingly.  For instance, they might price protect (i.e., demand a higher return 
for their risk) or require independent monitoring like the use of an external auditor to reduce the 
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agency costs.  As a result of such incentives problems between a firm and its investors prices and 
disclosures might not always reflect the underlying true economics.  This misrepresentation, often 
referred to as earnings manipulation or earnings management, introduces bias into the accounting 
system thereby hampering its usefulness for valuation. 
3. Institutional and macroeconomic trends 
In this section, I discuss institutional and macroeconomic trends with the potential to affect the 
relation between accounting information and firm value.  The idea is to identify drivers of change 
that could lead to an increase or decrease of the value relevance of accounting information over time 
or give rise to differences in the cross-section.  I discuss three factors: (i) the global trend towards 
strengthening regulation and harmonizing financial reporting, (ii) the extended use of fair values over 
historical cost, and (iii) the recurring occurrence of accounting scandals, market bubbles, and 
financial crises.  Unavoidably, this selection is incomplete and subjective, but all three topics have 
received much attention in recent years and are closely tied to the accounting system. 
3.1. Regulation, standard-setting, and harmonization of financial reporting 
Regulation is a widespread phenomenon around the world, has grown vastly over the years, and 
touches all aspects of our lives (see e.g., Shleifer 2005).  Arguments in favor of regulation refer, 
among other things, to the existence of externalities, economy-wide cost savings, commitment 
problems, and insufficient penalties for individuals.  At the same time, regulations can impose 
substantial costs.  For instance, regulators may face serious information problems, are often 
incompetent or even corrupt, or can be captured by the regulatory process.  In addition, regulations 
need adequate implementation and enforcement in order to be effective (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and 
Leuz 2011).  These features imply that the net benefits of regulations are not a priori obvious, that 
new regulations can create strong incentives for all parties involved, and that even though the same 
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on paper the effect of regulations can vary substantially across entities or individuals depending on 
how they are implemented and enforced. 
The trend towards more and more comprehensive regulation extends to the accounting system.  
The goal of accounting standards is to provide a unified framework for the measurement and 
disclosure of business transactions relevant to investors, lenders, and other creditors.  Thus, standard-
setters face a tradeoff between expanding the set of rules to keep up with the changing business 
environment and protect the interests of investors (in light of the abovementioned adverse selection 
and moral hazard issues) versus leaving managers with enough room to convey their superior 
knowledge to corporate outsiders while staying within extant rules and regulations. 
Probably the largest regulatory change in accounting history is the global move towards 
mandatory IFRS reporting (see e.g., Ball 2006; Nobes 2006; Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki 2010; Pope 
and McLeay 2011).  Since the mid-2000s more than 100 countries have either adopted IFRS or are in 
the process of doing so.  Proponents of this change argue that harmonizing and tightening accounting 
standards improve the transparency and comparability of financial reports.  More transparent 
disclosures and reporting rules, applied consistently across countries and industries, should facilitate 
benchmarking and the prediction of future earnings.  Consequently, we would expect a general 
increase in the relevance of accounting numbers for valuation purposes that is most pronounced in 
countries with weaker accounting standards (relative to IFRS).  In addition, cross-country differences 
in accounting should vanish over time (even if we allow for learning to take place). 
On the other hand, it is not obvious whether simply mandating new accounting standards is 
sufficient to change firms’ reporting behavior.  In light of uniform (and potentially indiscriminating) 
disclosures fundamental analysis could become even more difficult.  Moreover, accounting practices 
not only reflect rules and regulations, but also managers’ reporting incentives that are shaped by firm 
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attributes (e.g., capital needs, ownership structure, growth prospects) and a country’s institutional 
environment (e.g., its legal tradition, the protection of minority shareholder rights, etc.).  Hence, IFRS 
need to be backed-up by adequate enforcement that ensures proper implementation and follow-up 
action by the regulator in case of incompliance.4  Under this view, IFRS might only have an impact 
on the valuation role of accounting if bundled with supporting enforcement changes or if appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms are already in place.  That said, even though the verdict on the economic 
effects of IFRS is still out, many studies so far underscore the importance of the institutional 
environment and changes therein for the observed benefits around the adoption of IFRS. 
3.2. Extended use of fair values over historical cost 
In synch with the trend of harmonization, accounting standards themselves have become more 
reliant on fair values over historical cost when measuring assets and liabilities on a firm’s balance 
sheet (see e.g., Barth 2006; Benston, Bromwich, Litan, and Wagenhofer 2006; Laux and Leuz 2009).  
If quoted prices in active markets are readily available, the measurement is straightforward and 
overall, the book value of equity should get closer to its market value and react more quickly to 
changes in price.  However, for many assets and liabilities liquid markets do not exist or, if they do, 
markets might dry up when we need their guidance the most, namely during periods of crisis and 
financial distress.  Management then has to switch to historical cost accounting or, under certain 
conditions, can use the so-called mark-to-model approach, which requires assumptions about the 
underlying input parameters of the fair value estimates.  This approach brings us back to the 
discretion inherent in the accounting system whose effect can be twofold: (i) improve the 
                                                
4  For instance, in the European Union (EU) the IAS regulation that prescribed mandatory IFRS for listed firms 
required member states to take appropriate measures to ensure compliance with IFRS.  Consequently, several EU 
countries strengthened the enforcement of financial reporting in conjunction with the IFRS mandate or shortly 
thereafter.  Yet, substantial heterogeneity in how IFRS are enforced remains (see Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2012). 
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informativeness and value relevance of accounting numbers, or (ii) incentivize managers to selfishly 
manipulate accounting numbers thereby introducing bias into the financial statements. 
Another issue with fair value accounting is the asymmetric treatment of price changes.  While 
the balance sheet always represents the estimate of an asset or a liability’s fair value at period end, the 
period-to-period change in value does not consistently flow through net income.  For instance, 
depending on the classification of securities as trading or available-for-sale, the unrealized gain or 
loss ends up either in the income statement or as part of other comprehensive income on the balance 
sheet.  This asymmetry could lead to a reduced relevance of income statement numbers for valuation 
purposes, but strengthen the position of the balance sheet. 
Other problems frequently cited in conjunction with fair value accounting are unwanted short-
termism that could cause firms to realize gains before the intended maturity of a project, doubts about 
the efficiency of market prices, especially in times of low liquidity and crisis (which in the extreme 
could create a downward spiral), or intensified volatility of earnings due to the procyclical nature of 
fair values.  However, the fact that the accounting system may act as focal point for management 
incentives is not unique to fair value accounting but applies to many instances, market efficiency is at 
the core of any association study, and procyclicality could actually increase the timeliness of 
accounting information instead of just exacerbate value swings.  Moreover and as already pointed out 
in the introduction, the equity perspective is just one of the many facets of financial reporting, and in 
a world in which frictions and contractual obligations tied to accounting numbers exist, contracting 
issues are likely to interfere with the equity valuation goal (e.g., Holthausen and Watts 2001). 
3.3. Accounting scandals, bubbles, and financial crises 
Over the past 15 years, the use of accounting numbers has been marred by numerous scandals 
(Enron and Parmalat are just two prominent examples), and repeatedly the usefulness of traditional 
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GAAP reporting for decision-making was questioned, in particular in industries with few economic 
transactions that pass the reliability and verifiability criteria typically required for recognition in the 
balance sheet (e.g., during the internet ‘bubble’ in the late 90s).  In addition, we have experienced 
(and still are experiencing) several financial crises that have severely impacted companies’ financial 
statements thereby casting doubt on the usefulness of accounting information for firm valuation. 
One thing these episodes have in common is that stock prices deviate from the true value of the 
firm, at least in hindsight, until investors’ beliefs catch up with the underlying fundamentals at the 
outbreak of the crisis, the burst of the bubble, or the uncovering of the extreme earnings 
manipulations.5  Put differently, we have observed, in different settings and over extended periods of 
time, a decoupling of fundamental information and quoted prices.  This decoupling emerges from 
both sides.  On the one hand, management might misstate earnings and balance sheet numbers to 
achieve short-term goals.  For instance, Enron inflated its revenue by reporting gross instead of net 
sales figures, recorded long-term energy contracts using mark-to-market accounting (i.e., preempting 
future unrealized profits at the time of sale), and hid large portions of its debt in special purpose 
entities that were exempt from consolidation. 
On the other hand, market prices can become independent of investors’ beliefs about and 
realizations of firm and macroeconomic fundamentals.  For instance, during the dotcom boom firms 
traded at commonly used valuation ratios like price-to-book or, if already profitable, earnings-to-
price in the hundreds, far above long-term means.  It was not unusual for startup firms to go public 
without having earned a single profit or sold a single product.  In both of the above cases the 
                                                
5  Note that earnings management, even in such extreme cases like Enron or Parmalat, the creation and duration of 
bubbles, or the extent of crises do not assume irrationality, but can be explained by rationally behaving individuals.  
For instance, in the case of earnings management we refer to the existence of private information and misaligned 
incentives (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Schipper 1989), for bubbles we often rely on heterogeneous beliefs 
among investors and the need for a coordination mechanism like a signal of when the bubble is likely to burst (e.g., 
Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003), and for crises investors’ funding constraints can induce co-movement of prices with 
the market instead of with fundamentals (e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). 
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decoupling of market prices as quoted on the stock exchange and fundamental values as depicted in 
the firm’s balance sheet and income statement could render the conceptual links between firm value 
and accounting information moot (see Figure 1).  Consequently, the value relevance of accounting 
information should diminish.6  In its place, other functions of the accounting system like stewardship, 
monitoring, or contracting could take on a more prominent role. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Relevance lost or relevance regained over the last 30 years? 
Against the backdrop of the conceptual underpinnings and the institutional and macroeconomic 
forces potentially affecting the relation between accounting information and firm value, I now take 
these arguments to the data.  More specifically, I examine the long-term trends in the explanatory 
power of accounting numbers for measures of market value in a large international sample over the 
1981 to 2008 period.  The idea is to provide descriptive evidence on whether aggregate balance sheet 
and income statement numbers (total assets and liabilities, book value of equity, and net income) 
explain more or less of the variation in market values and stock returns over time.  In a second step, I 
examine whether the general time trends differ across institutional regimes (e.g., by a country’s code 
law or common law legal tradition) or the state of the economy (e.g., by the extent of market 
integration).7  I then use these relative comparisons over time and across countries to measure a loss 
or increase of relevance of the accounting system as regulated by GAAP. 
                                                
6  In line with these arguments, Lev and Zarowin (1999) find a reduction in the usefulness of reported earnings and 
book values, and attribute this effect largely to changes in the business environment (e.g., innovation, new 
technologies, etc.)  At the same time, Core, Guay, and Van Buskirk (2003) find only mixed evidence of such a 
reduction in value relevance during the dotcom boom. 
7  Due to the limitations of association studies I cannot (and do not attempt to) directly assess the marginal effect of the 
three trends outlined in Section 3 (i.e., IFRS adoption, fair value accounting, and accounting scandals or market 
bubbles).  I use general characterizations of countries’ institutional environment and time-varying macroeconomic 
indicators on their behalf.  This should allow me to uncover systematic differences over time and in the cross-section, 
but also indicates that the interpretation has to be taken with a grain of salt. 
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My research question follows in the footsteps of earlier studies.  Most notably, Francis and 
Schipper (1999) study the changes in explanatory power for a sample of U.S. firms through the mid-
90s.  They document a loss in relevance of the income statement (in line with popular claims that 
accounting has become less useful), but also an increase in relevance of the balance sheet.  My 
analysis extends their research to an international setting and a longer time period.  For both 
dimensions it is not a priori clear whether the U.S. evidence applies.  Basu (1997) finds that during 
periods of high legal liability exposure for auditors, firms recognize bad news on a more timely basis 
than during periods of low legal exposure.  In a similar vein, Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) show 
that the value relevance of earnings (losses) systematically varies across countries’ legal regime and 
decreases (increases) in the second half of their 1985 to 1995 sample period.  Both studies illustrate 
how the accounting system does not function in a vacuum, but is closely tied to the institutional 
environment and shaped by country-level and firm-level incentives.  This insight is important when 
assessing the value relevance of accounting numbers for a large global sample and a horizon 
stretching over 30 years.8 
I will next briefly describe the research design, explain how I measure changes in value 
relevance, and provide details on the sample selection and composition.  I then present results from 
annual cross-sectional regressions for the entire sample and test for the existence of a simple linear 
trend in the data.  Finally, I partition the sample into various subgroups and examine whether for each 
subgroup differential time trends in value relevance exist. 
                                                
8  Other papers that examine time-series changes in value relevance (mostly for U.S. data) and relate those changes to 
various firm-specific or industry-wide and country-wide factors include Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997); Brown, 
Lo, and Lys (1999); Lev and Zarowin (1999); Core, Guay, and Van Buskirk (2003).  Alford et al. (1993) document 
international differences in value relevance.  Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) show a negative correlation 
between earnings quality and (idiosyncratic) return risk over the 1962 to 2001 period. 
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4.2. Test design and sample description 
Following prior literature, I measure the relation between market values and accounting numbers 
using four models, two focusing on the income statement and two on the balance sheet.  More 
specifically, I estimate the following four regression specifications using OLS: 
Earnings relation: RET = ß0 + ß1NI/P + ß2!NI/P + " (1) 
Reverse earnings relation: NI/P = ß0 + ß1RD + ß2RET + ß3RD*RET + " (2) 
Balance sheet relation: P = ß0 + ß1AST + ß2LIAB + " (3) 
Book value and earnings relation: P = ß0 + ß1BV + ß2NI + ". (4) 
I use the annual buy-and-hold stock returns (RET) and the market value per share at fiscal year 
end (P) as the market measures.  The accounting measures are net income (NI) and the yearly change 
therein (!NI), total assets (AST), total liabilities (LIAB), and the book value of equity (BV).  To 
estimate the Basu (1997)-style reverse earnings relation, I also define a binary indicator RD set to one 
in years with negative stock returns and zero otherwise.  The raw values are computed on a per share 
basis and denominated in US$.  I truncate all variables at the first and 99th percentile.  For further 
details on the measurement of the variables see the notes to Table 2. 
The intuition underlying these models is to relate (undeflated) balance sheet amounts to the 
market value of the firm or, in the spirit of a changes specification, to correlate stock returns to the 
(deflated) levels and changes in earnings.  For the reverse earnings relation, we use returns as a proxy 
for changes in economic income and relate them to accounting income, each separately for ‘good 
news’ and ‘bad news’ events.  I operationalize value relevance as the explanatory power of the above 
regressions (measured by the adjusted R2), i.e., the percentage of the variation in stock returns and 
price explained by the accounting variables.  I interpret changes in explanatory power as gains or 
 18 
losses in the relevance of financial statement information.  To formally test for systematic changes 
over time, I estimate the following two regression models: 
Linear trend model: Adjusted R2 = ß0 + ß1TIME + " (5) 
Two-period model: Adjusted R2 = ß0 + ß1POST94 + ". (6) 
I take the adjusted R2, the dependent variable, from annual cross-sectional regressions of either 
the entire sample (resulting in one observation per year) or of individual countries (resulting in one 
observation per country and year).  The two trend variables are: TIME set to one in the initial sample 
year, and increasing by one for every year thereafter, and POST94 set equal to zero in the first sample 
half, and to one in the second half.  These variables allow for a linear trend in value relevance over 
time, or alternatively break up the entire sample into two equal-length periods, and compare the value 
relevance across the two subsets.  In the cross-sectional tests I will later interact the trend variables 
with variables for the respective partitions. 
The sample consists of all observations between 1981 and 2008 with sufficient accounting data 
(Worldscope) and stock price data (Datastream) to estimate the four valuation models.  I require a 
minimum market value of 1 US$ million and only include countries with at least 500 observations 
(25 in any given year).  This selection procedure results in a sample of 324,090 firm-years (807 
country-years) from 40 countries. 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample by country (Panel A) and year (Panel B) together 
with mean values for a select few market and accounting measures.  While there are a several large 
countries in the firm-year analysis (e.g., U.S., Japan, U.K.), the country-year panel is much more 
balanced and no single country assumes a dominant role.  The average annual stock return over the 
sample period is 12.6 percent (not adjusted for market returns).  However, this number varies largely 
by country and over time.  Stock returns were negative in 46.1 percent of the firm-years, but the 
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proportion is much higher in times of crisis (e.g., in 2008 or in the early 2000s) and considerably 
lower in the first half of the sample.  This pattern is consistent with a more frequent occurrence of 
crises in later years, and should be kept in mind when examining whether the accounting system has 
become more conservative over time (i.e., recognizes economic losses faster).  On average, net 
income (change in net income) before extraordinary items amounts to 2.9 (1.6) percent of price.  This 
number has been steadily decreasing over the years.  The table also includes a country-by-country list 
of the institutional variables discussed later in the cross-sectional analyses.  In Table 2, I report 
distributional characteristics (Panel A) and correlation coefficients (Panel B) for the variables used in 
the valuation models.  Not surprisingly, stock returns are most highly correlated with earnings and 
security prices with book values of equity. 
4.3. General trends in value relevance 
I start with estimating the four valuation models in the pooled sample employing a single time-
series and cross-sectional regression, and report results in Panel A of Table 3.  To mitigate concerns 
about dependence of the residuals, I assess the statistical significance of the coefficients with robust 
standard errors clustered by country and year (t-statistics in parentheses).  Throughout the panel, the 
coefficient estimates are all significant and in line with prior literature.  The earnings model explains 
about 7 percent of the variation in returns.  As expected, the explanatory power of the reverse 
earnings model is higher, 9.6 percent, and almost all of it stems from the quicker incorporation of 
‘bad news’.  The balance sheet model and, even more pronounced, the combined earnings and book 
value of equity model explain about 50 percent of the variation in market values. 
More to the point than these average numbers is an analysis of explanatory power over time.  
Thus, in Panel B of Table 3, I report the coefficients and adjusted R2s for the four valuation models, 
estimated separately each year from 1981 to 2008.  Using country-clustered standard errors, most but 
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not all coefficients are significant (not tabulated).  In Figure 2, I plot the adjusted R2s from the 
contemporaneous relations between market and accounting measures over time.  Panel A contains the 
two earnings models, Panel B the balance sheet model and the combined earnings and book value of 
equity model.  A few things are noteworthy: first, the explanatory power of the reverse earnings 
model almost always exceeds the explanatory power of the traditional earnings model.  Thus, the 
asymmetric recognition of ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ and the delayed incorporation of news in 
earnings seem better suited to explain the usefulness of the accounting system.  Yet, the difference 
between the two models is never too big, and the respective adjusted R2s are highly correlated.  
Second, there is a distinct negative trend in the explanatory power of the two earnings models.  The 
proportion explained by the income statement has continuously gone down, and net income has lost 
about a third of its explanatory power over the last 30 years.  Third, balance sheet numbers have 
always a substantially higher adjusted R2 than the income statement, but the former are trumped by 
the combination of book values and earnings.  Thus, both the flow and the stock of accounting 
information are important for valuation.  Finally, the time-series pattern of the two balance sheet 
models is ambiguous.  While the value relevance of the balance sheet seems to go down in the first 
sample half, it reverses in the second half.  Over the entire period, no distinct pattern emerges. 
In Panel C of Table 3, I confirm the results of Figure 2 using the 28 annual adjusted R2s from 
each valuation model to estimate the linear trend specification in Eq. (5).  The TIME coefficient is 
significantly negative in both earnings models.  As a separate analysis of the two sub-periods reveals, 
the loss in relevance primarily occurred during the 1981 to 1994 period, but came to a stop in the 
later years.  At same time, we observe a loss in relevance of the balance sheet in the first sample half, 
which reverses from 1995 to 2008.  In sum, my findings do not suggest a general loss of relevance of 
accounting numbers, but indicate an ongoing shift in focus from the income statement to the balance 
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sheet.9  However, the average results do not allow any insights into the potential drivers behind the 
change, and might merely conceal more refined patterns correlated with the institutional and 
economic environment across countries.  I will turn to these explanations next. 
4.4. Differences in value relevance across institutional and macroeconomic factors 
To test for cross-sectional differences, I modify the valuation and time-series models and 
introduce a (binary or time-varying) partitioning variable, PART, which I interact with all the 
independent variables.  This fully interacted specification lets me separately estimate the effects for 
each subset and assess the statistical significance of the differences across groups.  The resulting 
time-series trend models look like follows: 
Linear trend model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2TIME + ß3PART*TIME + " (5a) 
Two-period model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2POST94 + ß3PART*POST94 + ". (6a) 
To increase the power of the tests, I estimate these models with the adjusted R2s from country-
year regressions using all observations in a given country and year.  I also include country fixed 
effects, essentially controlling for all unobserved time-invariant factors in a country that contribute to 
the explanatory power of the model.10  I define PART with six country-level variables: (1) a country’s 
legal tradition, (2) the U.S. economy (versus the remaining countries), (3) an index of the protection 
of minority shareholder rights, (4) an index of disclosure requirements in securities offerings, (5) an 
index of market integration, and (6) aggregate growth prospects.  I transform the first four 
partitioning variables into binary indicators using the sample median as cutoff.  The last two variables 
are measured on a yearly basis (and hence time-varying).  See the notes to Table 1 for further details 
on the partitioning variables.  The intuition behind the choice of partitioning variables is to select 
                                                
9  These results are in line with Collins, Maydew, and Weiss (1997), and Francis and Schipper (1999). 
10  As a consequence of including country fixed effects, the main effect of the partitioning variables (ß1) drops from the 
model, and we only can estimate the two trend coefficients (ß2 and ß3) when PART is a binary indicator variable. 
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broad characterizations of the institutional and macroeconomic environment that might capture 
correlated factors of the time-series trends in the value relevance of the accounting system.  Because 
of this nature (and the structure of the tests) causal interpretations are not possible. 
I limit the cross-sectional analyses to two models: the earnings relation for the relevance of the 
income statement (Table 4) and the balance sheet model with total assets and liabilities (Table 5).11 
For completeness, I first estimate pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions of the valuation 
models fully interacted with PART (using firm-year observations), and report the results in Panel A of 
Tables 4 and 5.  The results show that the overall relation between market values and accounting 
numbers is fairly stable and does not vary much across the different subsamples (i.e., just a few of the 
interaction terms are statistically significant).  Only aggregate growth seems to have an impact on the 
balance sheet and the earnings relation. 
I next analyze the pattern in explanatory power over time and how it differs across subsets.  To 
illustrate the idea behind this comparison, I plot the adjusted R2s from 28 annual cross-sectional 
regressions separately for common law countries and code law countries in Figure 3.  As Panel A 
shows, the negative trend in the relevance of net income is much more pronounced (and only 
significant) in common law countries than in code law countries.  By the end of the sample period the 
two sets of countries are not distinguishable.  The results for the balance sheet relation are mixed.  
While the explanatory power of total assets and liabilities remains flat in common law countries, I 
observe a slight upward trend in code law countries (significant at the 10 percent level).  Again, by 
the end of the sample period, the two subsets are indistinguishable from each other.  Overall, the 
graphical analysis suggests that institutional differences have become less important over time, in line 
with increased harmonization efforts of accounting standards and ongoing market integration. 
                                                
11  When I repeat the analyses with the reverse earnings relation and the combined earnings and book value of equity 
relation, the results are very similar to those tabulated and none of the inferences change. 
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The analysis of the country-year adjusted R2s in Panel B of Tables 4 and 5 provide the following 
insights: first, the decline in the explanatory power of earnings is present in the entire sample and 
primarily occurred in the second sample half.12,13  The loss in relevance is more pronounced in 
markets characterized by strong institutions, i.e., common law countries with strong disclosure 
requirements and integrated markets.  Only where higher growth prospects are present, the negative 
trend is slightly abated.  Second, while insignificant for the entire sample, there exists a distinct 
upward trend in the relevance of balance sheet data in common law countries with strong investor 
protection, stricter disclosure requirements and integrated markets.  The U.S. economy is a notable 
exception because there I find a decrease in the explanatory power of total assets and liabilities.  No 
or a slightly negative trend is apparent in countries with generally weaker institutions.  The results 
obtain after including country fixed effects, effectively controlling for unobserved (time-invariant) 
heterogeneity across countries.  Finally, by the end of the sample period the differences across groups 
are often insignificant.  In sum, the results illustrate that the role of accounting numbers for valuation 
purposes varies substantially (and systematically) with countries’ institutional context (e.g., Ball, 
Kothari, and Robin 2000; Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki 2003; Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz 2006). 
5. Conclusion 
In this study I discuss the role of financial reporting for firm valuation and empirically examine 
whether balance sheet and income statement numbers have lost or regained their relevance over the 
last 30 years.  To frame my discussion, I use the three conceptual links outlined in Beaver (1998) that 
tie market values to contemporaneous financial statements via future expected cash flows, dividend 
                                                
12  I assess the statistical significance in the country-year analyses using t-statistics that account for within country cross-
sectional and temporal dependence (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). 
13  The finding of a more pronounced decline in the value relevance of earnings after 1994 somewhat differs from the 
results using only 28 yearly observations presented in Table 3, Panel C.  This might be due to the unbalanced country 
composition of the firm-year sample. 
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payouts, and accounting earnings.  The accounting system emerges as a particularly important source 
of information when it comes to analyzing the fundamentals of the firm.  I then briefly discuss the 
general structure of so-called association studies that test for a contemporaneous positive correlation 
between accounting numbers and measures of market value.  The explanatory power of such a 
specification serves as proxy for the relevance of financial reporting.  Increases in the adjusted R2s 
indicate a gain in relevance; decreases a loss in relevance.  At the same time it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of this approach.  We assume the price formation process is efficient, 
and market participants, even though they have different information, pursue similar goals.  Both 
assumptions likely are not always valid.  Moreover, association studies do not lend themselves to 
draw causal inferences and therefore should be interpreted cautiously. 
I next discuss three institutional and macroeconomic trends with the potential to affect the 
relation between accounting information and firm value, namely the global trend towards 
strengthening regulation and harmonizing financial reporting, the extended use of fair values over 
historical cost, and the recurring occurrence of accounting scandals, market bubbles, and financial 
crises.  The idea is to identify drivers of change that could lead to an increase or decrease of the value 
relevance of accounting information over time or give rise to differences in the cross-section.  Even 
though the selection is necessarily subjective and incomplete, it illustrates that there exist plenty of 
reasons for why the role of financial reporting likely has changed over the last three decades. 
Finally, I take the above arguments to the data.  I estimate four different valuation models – two 
focusing on the income statement, two on the balance sheet – and then examine the pattern in 
explanatory power over time.  The analysis provides two general insights: first, the loss in relevance 
of the income statement, already documented in prior studies, continues over a more recent period 
and is not just limited to a select few countries but present in a large international sample.  If 
anything, the decline in explanatory power is even more pronounced in countries with a strong 
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institutional background.  Thus, recent changes in the accounting standards but also in the economic 
environment seem to have rendered earnings numbers less useful for valuation purposes. 
Second, with regard to the balance sheet I do not observe much of a change in the overall 
explanatory power.  However, looking more closely, I find that the trend points downwards during 
the first sample half and in countries with relatively weaker institutions, and upwards in the second 
half and in common law countries with strong investor protection, strict disclosure requirements and 
integrated markets.  Thus, while stable on average, substantial differences in the value relevance of 
the balance sheet remain.  This suggests that harmonizing accounting standards, rules, and regulation 
cannot completely overcome more generic differences in how firms utilize the discretion in the 
accounting system to communicate with outside stakeholders.  More research is needed with refined 
methodologies and improved explanations to help us better understand the complex relation between 
accounting information and firm valuation. 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual link between market measures and accounting measures 
 
 
 
 
The figure illustrates how contemporaneous accounting numbers are conceptually linked to the value of the firm via 
future expected earnings, dividends, and cash flows. It is based on Beaver (1998), chapter 4. 
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Figure 2 
Contemporaneous relation between market and accounting measures over time 
Panel A: Explanatory power of earnings relation and reverse earnings relation 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Explanatory power of balance sheet relation and book value and earnings relation 
 
 
 
 
The figure plots the adjusted R2s from 28 annual cross-sectional regressions of the (reverse) earnings relation (Panel 
A), and the balance sheet relation and the book value and earnings relation (Panel B). The sample comprises all 
firm-year observations from 40 countries over the 1981 to 2008 period with accounting data and stock price data 
available to estimate the four models (see Table 1). The four regression specifications reflecting the relation between 
market measures and accounting measures are: 
(1) Earnings relation: RET = ß0 + ß1NI/P + ß2!NI/P + ! 
(2) Reverse earnings relation: NI/P = ß0 + ß1RD + ß2RET + ß3RD*RET + ! 
(3) Balance sheet relation: P = ß0 + ß1AST + ß2LIAB + ! 
(4) Book value and earnings relation: P = ß0 + ß1BV + ß2NI + !. 
For variable details see Table 2. The figure also reports a linear trend line for each model (dashed). The linear trend 
is statistically significant (at the 1% level) in Panel A, but not in Panel B. 
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Figure 3 
Relation between market and accounting measures conditional on countries’ legal tradition 
Panel A: Explanatory power of earnings relation across common and code law countries 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Explanatory power of balance sheet relation across common and code law countries 
 
 
 
 
The figure plots the adjusted R2s from 28 annual cross-sectional regressions of the earnings relation (Panel A) and 
the balance sheet relation (Panel B), each separately for countries with common versus code law legal tradition (La 
Porta et al. 1997; Ball, Kothari, and Robin 2000). The sample comprises all firm-year observations from 40 
countries over the 1981 to 2008 period with accounting data and stock price data (see Table 1). The two regression 
specifications reflecting the relation between market measures and accounting measures are: 
(1) Earnings relation: RET = ß0 + ß1NI/P + ß2!NI/P + ! 
(2) Balance sheet relation: P = ß0 + ß1AST + ß2LIAB + ! 
For variable details see Table 2. The figure also reports a linear trend line for each model and subset (dashed). The 
linear trend is statistically significant (at the 1% level) for common law countries in Panel A as well as for code law 
countries (at the 10% level) in Panel B, but insignificant in the other cases. 
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Table 1 
Sample composition by country and year 
Panel A: Number of observations, mean market and accounting measures, and institutional variables by country 
     Market measures Accounting measures Institutional variables 
Country Unique 
firms 
Firm- 
years 
Country- 
years 
 RET RD  NI/P !NI/P  Legal  
tradition 
U.S.  
economy 
Anti-self- 
dealing 
Disclosure 
rqmts. 
Market  
integration 
Growth  
prospects 
Argentina 83 687 14  0.121 0.456  -0.001 0.023  0 0 0.34 (0) 0.50 (0) 0.55 1.21 
Australia 1,832 10,672 28  0.171 0.433  -0.010 0.031  1 0 0.76 (1) 0.75 (1) 0.74 2.43 
Austria 145 1,137 21  0.101 0.419  0.045 0.005  0 0 0.21 (0) 0.25 (0) 0.81 2.18 
Belgium 181 1,564 21  0.101 0.408  0.056 0.018  0 0 0.54 (1) 0.42 (0) 0.92 2.05 
Brazil 254 1,489 14  0.226 0.409  0.117 0.024  0 0 0.27 (0) 0.25 (0) 0.57 1.87 
Canada 1,976 13,768 28  0.151 0.444  0.005 0.023  1 0 0.64 (1) 0.92 (1) 0.79 2.39 
Chile 177 1,584 17  0.184 0.364  0.073 0.006  0 0 0.63 (1) 0.58 (0) 0.78 1.64 
China 1,427 9,030 9  0.206 0.574  0.020 0.003  0 0 0.76 (1) n.a. (0) 0.54 3.40 
Denmark 245 2,874 21  0.142 0.391  0.069 0.022  0 0 0.46 (0) 0.58 (0) 0.83 1.77 
Finland 164 1,318 14  0.117 0.406  0.057 0.014  0 0 0.46 (0) 0.50 (0) 0.86 2.15 
France 1,214 10,156 28  0.133 0.418  0.042 0.016  0 0 0.38 (0) 0.75 (1) 0.72 2.24 
Germany 1,084 9,033 28  0.081 0.462  0.009 0.023  0 0 0.28 (0) 0.42 (0) 0.69 2.68 
Greece 348 2,896 17  0.082 0.544  0.026 0.003  0 0 0.22 (0) 0.33 (0) 0.71 2.50 
Hong Kong 994 7,836 25  0.150 0.477  0.046 0.026  1 0 0.96 (1) 0.92 (1) 0.96 1.54 
India 826 5,108 16  0.299 0.431  0.095 0.020  1 0 0.58 (1) 0.92 (1) 0.37 2.89 
Indonesia 282 1,493 16  0.159 0.472  0.074 0.015  0 0 0.65 (1) 0.50 (0) 0.57 1.35 
Ireland 118 937 22  0.148 0.393  0.050 0.009  1 0 0.79 (1) 0.67 (1) 0.91 2.38 
Israel 176 1,104 15  0.105 0.458  0.024 0.022  1 0 0.73 (1) 0.67 (1) 0.81 1.96 
Italy 417 3,498 21  0.066 0.469  0.019 0.006  0 0 0.42 (0) 0.67 (1) 0.69 1.91 
Japan 3,983 52,259 28  0.048 0.546  0.016 0.009  0 0 0.50 (1) 0.75 (1) 0.49 1.89 
Korea (South) 980 6,555 20  0.155 0.494  0.055 0.027  0 0 0.47 (1) 0.75 (1) 0.56 1.16 
Malaysia 1,099 8,904 22  0.090 0.503  0.026 0.016  1 0 0.95 (1) 0.92 (1) 0.75 1.58 
Mexico 164 1,301 16  0.180 0.380  0.058 0.010  0 0 0.17 (0) 0.58 (0) 0.60 1.66 
The Netherlands 286 3,070 28  0.144 0.397  0.067 0.015  0 0 0.20 (0) 0.50 (0) 0.90 2.49 
New Zealand 146 1,039 17  0.136 0.381  0.056 0.025  1 0 0.95 (1) 0.67 (1) 0.80 2.11 
Norway 302 2,260 21  0.166 0.430  0.040 0.030  0 0 0.42 (0) 0.58 (0) 0.79 2.27 
Pakistan 114 983 15  0.281 0.363  0.130 0.024  1 0 0.41 (0) 0.58 (0) 0.39 2.07 
Philippines 192 1,405 17  0.159 0.409  0.058 -0.002  0 0 0.22 (0) 0.83 (1) 0.56 1.59 
Poland 159 969 12  0.224 0.433  0.041 0.022  0 0 0.29 (0) n.a. (0) 0.68 2.18 
Portugal 119 958 19  0.116 0.425  0.039 0.011  0 0 0.44 (0) 0.42 (0) 0.80 1.73 
Singapore 677 5,190 23  0.115 0.502  0.038 0.009  1 0 1.00 (1) 1.00 (1) 0.96 1.57 
South Africa 602 4,012 23  0.212 0.378  0.106 0.020  1 0 0.81 (1) 0.83 (1) 0.63 2.24 
Spain 209 2,213 21  0.150 0.378  0.052 0.007  0 0 0.37 (0) 0.50 (0) 0.78 2.22 
Sweden 448 3,653 22  0.134 0.447  0.036 0.035  0 0 0.33 (0) 0.58 (0) 0.87 2.59 
Switzerland 241 2,404 23  0.125 0.413  0.062 0.026  0 0 0.27 (0) 0.67 (1) 0.85 2.27 
Taiwan 1,329 8,672 16  0.096 0.499  0.016 0.021  0 0 0.57 (1) 0.75 (1) 0.58 1.57 
Thailand 566 4,599 18  0.093 0.517  0.060 0.014  1 0 0.81 (1) 0.92 (1) 0.60 1.56 
Turkey 234 1,825 15  0.317 0.398  0.067 0.020  0 0 0.43 (0) 0.50 (0) 0.61 2.17 
United Kingdom 3,222 26,815 28  0.113 0.436  0.036 0.016  1 0 0.95 (1) 0.83 (1) 0.77 2.63 
United States 11,684 98,820 28  0.141 0.427  0.023 0.016  1 1 0.65 (1) 1.00 (1) 0.64 2.65 
                   
Total (mean) 38,699 324,090 807   0.126 0.461   0.029 0.016          
(continued) 
Table 1 
Sample composition by country and year (continued) 
Panel B: Number of observations, and mean market and accounting measures by year 
  Market measures  Accounting measures 
Year 
Firm- 
years 
Country- 
years  RET RD  NI/P !NI/P 
1981 1,992 8  0.187 0.339  0.116 0.006 
1982 2,185 8  0.168 0.370  0.087 -0.011 
1983 2,338 8  0.461 0.112  0.095 0.024 
1984 2,609 9  0.112 0.397  0.088 0.022 
1985 2,915 9  0.305 0.218  0.076 0.004 
1986 3,490 12  0.286 0.241  0.063 0.010 
1987 3,964 15  0.128 0.429  0.059 0.016 
1988 4,968 21  0.196 0.322  0.075 0.019 
1989 5,896 22  0.253 0.258  0.069 0.009 
1990 6,652 23  -0.074 0.646  0.046 -0.009 
1991 7,362 25  0.123 0.463  0.039 -0.006 
1992 8,279 28  0.033 0.536  0.033 0.008 
1993 8,967 32  0.288 0.323  0.036 0.016 
1994 9,946 35  0.128 0.418  0.043 0.024 
1995 11,496 38  0.091 0.491  0.046 0.014 
1996 12,728 38  0.211 0.310  0.044 0.008 
1997 13,947 38  0.112 0.461  0.037 0.010 
1998 14,302 39  -0.032 0.609  0.021 -0.003 
1999 16,214 39  0.168 0.507  0.018 0.019 
2000 18,038 40  0.076 0.542  0.024 0.019 
2001 19,462 40  0.002 0.556  -0.003 -0.005 
2002 20,309 40  -0.020 0.579  -0.008 0.032 
2003 20,362 40  0.275 0.357  0.011 0.054 
2004 21,003 40  0.309 0.312  0.033 0.046 
2005 21,761 40  0.199 0.389  0.032 0.018 
2006 22,148 40  0.278 0.303  0.032 0.021 
2007 22,029 40  0.190 0.481  0.029 0.016 
2008 18,728 40  -0.320 0.862  0.004 -0.017 
         
Total (mean) 324,090 807  0.126 0.461  0.029 0.016 
 
The sample comprises 324,090 firm-year observations from 40 countries between 1981 and 2008, for which we 
have sufficient accounting data in Worldscope (WS) and stock price data in Datastream to estimate the valuation 
models. I require firms to have a minimum market value of equity of 1 US$ million, and limit the sample to 
countries with at least 500 observations (25 in any given year). This results in 807 country-year observations. The 
table reports the total number of unique firms and the number of firm-years (country-years) by country (Panel A) 
and year (Panel B). It also includes the means of the following market and accounting measures: RET is the annual 
buy-and-hold stock return inclusive of dividends and computed over a firm’s fiscal year. RD is a binary indicator set 
to one if a firm’s return RET is negative and zero otherwise. NI/P is annual earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. I compute earnings per share as total net income before extraordinary items 
(WS 01551) divided by the number of common shares outstanding (WS 05301). !NI/P is the year-to-year change in 
earnings per share (NI) scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. I truncate all market and 
accounting measures at the first and 99th percentile. Panel A also lists several country-level institutional and 
macroeconomic variables used to partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses: (1) a country’s legal tradition 
(1 = common law; 0 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997) and Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000); (2) the U.S. 
economy (= 1) versus the remaining countries (= 0); (3) the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) with 
above-median sample values reflecting better legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation 
(= 1); (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2006) with above-median sample values reflecting better disclosure rules (= 1); (5) market integration measured by 
the KOF index of economic globalization (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008) with higher values reflecting more 
cross-border flows of goods, capital, and services and fewer trade restrictions; and (6) growth prospects equal to the 
mean market-to-book ratio for all firms in a country and year. The latter two variables are measured on a yearly 
basis (and hence continuous). 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for market measures and accounting measures 
Panel A: Distributional characteristics 
(N = 324,090) Mean Std. dev. P1 P25 Median P75 P99 
Market measures:       
RET 0.126 0.574 -0.785 -0.221 0.033 0.334 2.368 
RD 0.461 0.498      
P 12.62 33.54 0.04 1.22 4.58 12.82 134.26 
        
Accounting measures:       
AST 30.91 80.38 0.05 1.70 7.44 22.82 409.52 
LIAB 22.51 68.20 0.01 0.63 3.37 13.00 333.90 
BV 7.83 17.97 0.03 0.71 2.98 8.10 87.13 
NI 0.52 2.14 -4.31 0.01 0.15 0.68 8.98 
NI/P 0.029 0.167 -0.657 0.006 0.050 0.093 0.406 
!NI/P 0.016 0.198 -0.537 -0.023 0.005 0.033 0.820 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients 
Variables P AST LIAB BV NI NI/P !NI/P 
RET 0.066 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 0.092 0.238 0.177 
P  0.496 0.383 0.701 0.545 0.056 -0.009 
AST   0.977 0.672 0.423 0.075 -0.014 
LIAB    0.506 0.330 0.063 -0.012 
BV  (N = 324,090)  0.591 0.087 -0.018 
NI      0.360 0.106 
NI/P       0.292 
 
The sample comprises 324,090 firm-year observations from 40 countries between 1981 and 2008, for which we 
have sufficient accounting data in Worldscope (WS) and stock price data in Datastream (see Table 1). The table 
presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and Pearson correlation coefficients (Panel B) for the firm-level market and 
accounting measures used to estimate the valuation models. I use the following market measures: RET is the annual 
buy-and-hold stock return inclusive of dividends and computed over a firm’s fiscal year. RD is a binary indicator set 
to one if a firm’s return (RET) is negative and zero otherwise. P is the market value of equity per share measured at 
the end of a firm’s fiscal year. The accounting measures are: AST and LIAB are the per-share numbers of total assets 
(WS 0299) and total liabilities (WS 03351). BV equals a firm’s common equity per share (WS 03501). NI is the 
per-share amount of total net income before extraordinary items (WS 01551). NI/P is annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. !NI/P is the year-to-year change in earnings per share 
(NI) scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. I compute all the per-share amounts by dividing the 
total values with the number of common shares outstanding (WS 05301). The raw values are translated into US$ 
using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. I truncate all market and accounting measures at the 
first and 99th percentile. In Panel B, all the correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 3 
Contemporaneous relations between market measures and accounting measures over the 1981 to 2008 period 
Panel A: Pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions 
   Earnings relation  Reverse earnings relation  Balance sheet relation  Book value & earnings relation 
Period N  NI/P !NI/P Adj. R2  RET RD*RET Adj. R2  AST LIAB Adj. R2  BV NI Adj. R2 
1981-2008 324,090  0.70*** 0.34*** 6.9%  0.02** 0.21*** 9.6%  1.10*** -1.07*** 46.7%  1.09*** 3.16*** 51.7% 
 (t-stat)  (13.79) (6.43)   (2.16) (6.47)   (8.03) (-8.00)   (7.79) (4.48)  
 
Panel B: Annual cross-sectional regressions 
   Earnings relation  Reverse earnings relation  Balance sheet relation  Book value & earnings relation 
Period N  NI/P !NI/P Adj. R2  RET RD*RET Adj. R2  AST LIAB Adj. R2  BV NI Adj. R2 
1981 1,992  0.99 0.34 10.9%  0.04 0.21 15.2%  0.66 -0.65 39.4%  0.49 3.69 48.4% 
1982 2,185  0.71 0.46 11.9%  0.06 0.19 12.9%  0.93 -0.94 50.6%  0.81 2.85 60.5% 
1983 2,338  0.69 0.77 10.3%  0.05 0.39 8.5%  1.31 -1.32 52.6%  1.28 1.88 56.9% 
1984 2,609  1.34 0.28 14.9%  0.06 0.12 16.8%  1.35 -1.37 47.3%  1.09 4.20 55.7% 
1985 2,915  1.22 0.26 15.1%  0.08 0.19 16.8%  1.28 -1.28 55.2%  1.38 1.23 60.9% 
1986 3,490  1.06 0.39 10.4%  0.04 0.28 15.1%  1.27 -1.27 59.9%  1.31 2.38 66.1% 
1987 3,964  0.77 0.32 5.5%  0.02 0.18 7.8%  0.98 -0.97 47.0%  1.09 1.40 53.7% 
1988 4,968  0.95 0.36 10.0%  0.05 0.21 12.4%  0.97 -0.94 57.6%  1.14 0.79 61.8% 
1989 5,896  0.81 0.41 8.6%  0.03 0.34 13.9%  1.15 -1.14 50.0%  1.02 3.19 51.0% 
1990 6,652  0.63 0.45 8.7%  0.00 0.26 14.6%  1.16 -1.15 46.6%  1.11 3.11 50.3% 
1991 7,362  0.89 0.28 10.9%  0.05 0.22 13.3%  1.01 -0.98 40.6%  0.95 4.32 46.0% 
1992 8,279  0.85 0.49 13.2%  0.04 0.20 13.5%  0.78 -0.73 42.8%  0.85 3.47 48.9% 
1993 8,967  0.80 0.45 8.0%  0.04 0.18 8.6%  0.89 -0.81 38.3%  1.16 3.31 46.6% 
1994 9,946  0.71 0.35 6.5%  0.04 0.12 6.3%  0.91 -0.84 41.2%  1.14 3.73 48.2% 
1995 11,496  0.64 0.48 6.4%  0.00 0.20 10.3%  0.94 -0.87 41.5%  1.08 3.53 48.5% 
1996 12,728  0.88 0.30 7.7%  0.03 0.16 10.4%  1.16 -1.13 46.6%  1.11 3.85 52.2% 
1997 13,947  1.22 0.24 10.4%  0.03 0.12 12.6%  1.24 -1.21 49.1%  1.19 3.83 54.7% 
1998 14,302  0.62 0.27 5.9%  0.00 0.21 9.7%  1.25 -1.22 53.8%  1.21 3.48 57.2% 
1999 16,214  0.42 0.39 3.7%  0.00 0.25 6.2%  1.21 -1.21 44.4%  1.19 2.21 46.7% 
2000 18,038  0.53 0.25 3.7%  -0.01 0.22 7.8%  1.22 -1.23 40.0%  1.18 2.30 43.1% 
2001 19,462  0.57 0.18 7.5%  0.03 0.20 9.6%  0.98 -0.97 39.4%  0.97 1.95 41.8% 
2002 20,309  0.62 0.15 9.1%  0.03 0.28 12.7%  0.88 -0.86 47.0%  0.87 2.62 50.4% 
2003 20,362  0.44 0.39 5.5%  0.01 0.26 6.5%  1.05 -1.03 52.1%  0.98 3.34 55.7% 
2004 21,003  0.65 0.42 7.1%  0.03 0.22 8.4%  1.29 -1.29 50.8%  1.23 2.88 54.4% 
2005 21,761  0.96 0.25 9.4%  0.04 0.22 12.8%  1.26 -1.23 51.9%  1.26 2.47 54.6% 
2006 22,148  0.74 0.32 6.3%  0.02 0.23 10.2%  1.30 -1.26 52.9%  1.11 4.48 59.5% 
2007 22,029  0.84 0.24 4.4%  0.01 0.26 10.8%  1.31 -1.29 55.8%  1.13 3.87 61.6% 
2008 18,728  0.56 0.14 7.1%  0.00 0.21 10.1%  0.91 -0.92 55.9%  0.86 2.38 62.4% 
                  
Average   0.79 0.34 8.5%  0.03 0.22 11.2%  1.09 -1.08 48.2%  1.08 2.96 53.5% 
(continued) 
Table 3 
Contemporaneous relations between market measures and accounting measures over the 1981 to 2008 period (continued) 
Panel C: Over time changes in annual explanatory power 
   Earnings relation  Reverse earnings relation  Balance sheet relation Book value & earnings relation 
Period N  ß0 TIME Adj. R2  ß0 TIME Adj. R2  ß0 TIME Adj. R2  ß0 TIME Adj. R2 
1981-2008 28  0.120*** -0.002*** 38.1%  0.138*** -0.002*** 20.7%  0.473*** 0.001 -3.0%  0.541*** -0.000 -3.5% 
 (t-stat)  (12.68) (-4.53)   (11.91) (-2.87)   (18.35) (0.46)   (21.62) (-0.28)  
                  
1981-1994 14  0.126*** -0.003** 12.3%  0.151*** -0.003 10.1%  0.529*** -0.007 10.1%  0.603*** -0.008** 24.3% 
 (t-stat)  (9.74) (-2.04)   (8.17) (-1.60)   (11.76) (-1.49)   (15.51) (-2.24)  
                  
1995-2008 14  0.074*** -0.000 -7.8%  0.093*** 0.000 -8.1%  0.305*** 0.008*** 34.4%  0.345*** 0.009*** 26.5% 
 (t-stat)   (2.72) (-0.28)   (4.06) (0.25)   (5.68) (3.99)   (5.29) (3.19)  
 
The sample comprises 324,090 firm-year observations from 40 countries between 1981 and 2008 (see Table 1). The table reports coefficient estimates and 
adjusted R2 values for the following four regression specifications reflecting the relation between market measures and accounting measures: 
(1) Earnings relation: RET = ß0 + ß1NI/P + ß2!NI/P + ! 
(2) Reverse earnings relation: NI/P = ß0 + ß1RD + ß2RET + ß3RD*RET + ! 
(3) Balance sheet relation: P = ß0 + ß1AST + ß2LIAB + ! 
(4) Book value and earnings relation: P = ß0 + ß1BV + ß2NI + !. 
For variable details see Table 2. In Panel A, I report results from a single pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by country and year. In Panel B, the results are from models run separately for each year. The row labeled average 
shows the mean of the yearly coefficient estimates and the yearly adjusted R2s. Panel C reports results from the following regression, run separately for each 
valuation model and using the data from Panel B as input: 
(5) Linear trend model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1TIME + !. 
TIME takes on the values of 1 through 28 for the sample years 1981 to 2008, respectively. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors. 
In Panels A and C, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
Table 4 
Differences in the earnings relation across various legal and economic factors 
Panel A: Pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions with interaction terms 
Earnings relation  Legal  tradition 
U.S.  
economy 
Anti- 
self-dealing 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Market  
integration 
Growth  
prospects 
Firm-years 
(N = 324,090) 
Benchmark 
case  
(1=Common; 
0=Code) 
(1=U.S.;  
0=Rest) 
(1=High; 
0=Low) 
(1=Strong; 
0=Weak) 
(High = Better  
integrated) 
(High = Higher 
growth) 
NI/P 0.700***  0.766*** 0.734*** 0.758*** 0.774*** 0.913*** 0.690*** 
 (13.79)  (12.58) (15.14) (9.49) (9.57) (4.95) (17.29) 
!NI/P 0.340***  0.291*** 0.292*** 0.303*** 0.342*** 0.418*** 0.312*** 
 (6.43)  (5.73) (7.22) (3.93) (4.15) (2.88) (6.49) 
PART*NI/P –  -0.100** -0.103 -0.071 -0.091 -0.316 0.053*** 
   (-2.20) (-1.32) (-1.34) (-1.53) (-1.13) (2.63) 
PART*!NI/P –  0.076* 0.167*** 0.047 -0.002 -0.113 0.007*** 
   (1.83) (3.49) (0.72) (-0.03) (-0.64) (2.79) 
         
Adj. R2 6.9%  7.0% 7.0% 6.9% 6.9% 6.9% 13.4% 
 
Panel B: Over time changes in the explanatory power of the earnings relation with interaction terms 
Linear trend   Legal  tradition 
U.S.  
economy 
Anti- 
self-dealing 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Market  
integration 
Growth  
prospects 
Country-years 
(N = 807) 
Benchmark 
case  
(1=Common; 
0=Code) 
(1=U.S.;  
0=Rest) 
(1=High; 
0=Low) 
(1=Strong; 
0=Weak) 
(High = Better 
integrated) 
(High = Higher 
growth) 
ß0 0.190***  0.187*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.204*** 0.273*** 
 (12.44)  (11.98) (12.21) (12.29) (11.63) (3.71) (10.31) 
PART –  – – – – -0.026 -0.043*** 
       (-0.26) (-4.36) 
TIME -0.004***  -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003 -0.006*** 
 (-5.40)  (-2.92) (-5.12) (-3.43) (-2.42) (-0.80) (-4.47) 
PART*TIME –  -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001*** 
   (-2.01) (-0.31) (-0.51) (-1.59) (-0.09) (2.71) 
         
Country fixed 
effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 5.9%  6.5% 5.9% 5.9% 6.1% 5.9% 7.8% 
         
F-test for differences [p-value]:       
TIME + PART*TIME = 0  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
PART + PART*TIME = 0  – – – – [0.79] [0.00] 
Two non-overlapping periods      
ß0 0.162***  0.159*** 0.162*** 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.190*** 0.227*** 
 (17.91)  (18.53) (17.88) (18.16) (18.39) (4.04) (8.88) 
PART –  – – – – -0.048 -0.032*** 
       (-0.68) (-3.18) 
POST94 -0.055***  -0.035*** -0.055*** -0.047*** -0.039** 0.005 -0.092*** 
 (-4.29)  (-2.60) (-4.17) (-3.04) (-2.47) (0.19) (-2.86) 
PART*POST94 –  -0.049*** -0.011 -0.015 -0.027* -0.073** 0.019 
   (-2.96) (-0.80) (-1.02) (-1.90) (-2.07) (1.59) 
         
Country fixed 
effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 6.1%  7.3% 6.1% 6.2% 6.4% 6.5% 8.3% 
         
F-test for differences [p-value]:       
POST94 + PART*POST94 = 0  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
PART + PART*POST94 = 0  – – – – [0.17] [0.00] 
(continued) 
Table 4 
Differences in the earnings relation across various legal and economic factors (continued) 
The sample comprises 324,090 firm-year (807 country-year) observations from 40 countries between 1981 and 2008 
(see Table 1). The table reports coefficient estimates for the following three regression specifications reflecting the 
relation between market measures and accounting measures as well as the trends in explanatory power over time: 
(1) Earnings relation: RET = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2NI/P + ß3!NI/P + ß4PART*NI/P + ß5PART*!NI/P + ! 
(2) Linear trend model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2TIME + ß3PART*TIME + " ßjCOUNTRYj + ! 
(3) Two-period model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2POST94 + ß3PART*POST94 + " ßjCOUNTRYj + !. 
PART is one of the six (binary or continuous) country-level institutional and macroeconomic partitioning variables 
described in Table 1. TIME takes on the values of 1 through 28 for the sample years 1981 to 2008, respectively. 
POST94 is a binary indicator set equal to zero in the years 1981 to 1994, and one in the years 1995 to 2008. 
COUNTRY is a vector of country fixed effects (coefficients not tabulated). For details on the market and accounting 
measures see Table 2. In Panel A, I report results from a single pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression of 
the earnings relation fully interacted with PART. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by country and year. Panel B reports results from estimating the linear trend or two-period model, again 
fully interacted with PART. The adjusted R2s from 807 country-year regressions of the earnings relation serve as the 
dependent variable. The t-statistics (in parentheses) account for within country cross-sectional and temporal 
dependence (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). The panel also reports p-values from F-tests comparing coefficients. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
Table 5 
Differences in the balance sheet relation across various legal and economic factors 
Panel A: Pooled time-series and cross-sectional regressions with interaction terms 
Balance sheet relation  Legal  tradition 
U.S.  
economy 
Anti- 
self-dealing 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Market  
integration 
Growth  
prospects 
Firm-years 
(N = 324,090) 
Benchmark 
case  
(1=Common; 
0=Code) 
(1=U.S.;  
0=Rest) 
(1=High; 
0=Low) 
(1=Strong; 
0=Weak) 
(High = Better  
integrated) 
(High = 
Higher growth) 
AST 1.097***  1.091*** 1.075*** 1.076*** 1.390*** 1.525*** 0.219** 
 (8.03)  (6.78) (7.17) (5.72) (4.76) (2.62) (2.22) 
LIAB -1.074***  -1.054*** -1.036*** -1.040*** -1.355*** -1.482*** -0.227** 
 (-8.00)  (-6.90) (-7.28) (-5.80) (-4.77) (-2.61) (-2.08) 
PART*AST –  -0.030 0.056 -0.027 -0.410 -0.583 0.613*** 
   (-0.16) (0.38) (-0.13) (-1.35) (-0.92) (10.45) 
PART*LIAB –  -0.003 -0.107 0.000 0.389 0.552 -0.599*** 
   (-0.02) (-0.76) (0.00) (1.31) (0.89) (-8.81) 
         
Adj. R2 46.7%  46.9% 47.0% 47.1% 48.4% 46.9% 79.2% 
 
Panel B: Over time changes in the explanatory power of the balance sheet relation with interaction terms 
Linear trend   Legal  tradition 
U.S.  
economy 
Anti- 
self-dealing 
Disclosure 
requirements 
Market  
integration 
Growth  
prospects 
Country-years 
(N = 807) 
Benchmark 
case  
(1=Common; 
0=Code) 
(1=U.S.;  
0=Rest) 
(1=High; 
0=Low) 
(1=Strong; 
0=Weak) 
(High = Better 
integrated) 
(High = Higher 
growth) 
ß0 0.519***  0.527*** 0.514*** 0.526*** 0.527*** 0.861*** 0.501*** 
 (26.05)  (25.43) (24.57) (25.94) (25.90) (8.33) (7.62) 
PART –  – – – – -0.534*** 0.009 
       (-2.78) (0.32) 
TIME 0.001  -0.002 0.002 -0.003* -0.001 -0.010* 0.002 
 (0.95)  (-0.98) (1.37) (-1.73) (-0.89) (-1.96) (0.41) 
PART*TIME –  0.006*** -0.010*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.018*** -0.000 
   (3.14) (-2.81) (4.93) (3.37) (2.84) (-0.15) 
         
Country fixed 
effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.2%  1.7% 1.0% 2.2% 0.7% 1.7% 0.2% 
         
F-test for differences [p-value]:       
TIME + PART*TIME = 0  [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.57] 
PART + PART*TIME = 0  – – – – [0.01] [0.74] 
Two non-overlapping periods      
ß0 0.529***  0.532*** 0.527*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 0.736*** 0.461*** 
 (53.73)  (52.72) (50.62) (52.72) (53.10) (10.59) (16.78) 
PART –  – – – – -0.316*** 0.033*** 
       (-2.80) (3.19) 
POST94 0.014  -0.011 0.021 -0.034 -0.013 -0.114*** 0.101** 
 (0.76)  (-0.50) (1.16) (-1.52) (-0.54) (-3.04) (2.40) 
PART*POST94 –  0.059** -0.174*** 0.085*** 0.042** 0.209*** -0.042** 
   (1.97) (-3.02) (4.31) (2.06) (3.06) (-2.31) 
         
Country fixed 
effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.1%  0.7% 1.0% 1.3% 0.4% 1.1% 0.8% 
         
F-test for differences [p-value]:       
POST94 + PART*POST94 = 0  [0.06] [0.01] [0.01] [0.12] [0.01] [0.03] 
PART + PART*POST94 = 0  – – – – [0.28] [0.44] 
(continued) 
Table 5 
Differences in the balance sheet relation across various legal and economic factors (continued) 
The sample comprises 324,090 firm-year (807 country-year) observations from 40 countries between 1981 and 2008 
(see Table 1). The table reports coefficient estimates for the following three regression specifications reflecting the 
relation between market measures and accounting measures as well as the trends in explanatory power over time: 
(1) Balance sheet relation: P = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2AST + ß3LIAB + ß4PART*AST + ß5PART*LIAB + ! 
(2) Linear trend model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2TIME + ß3PART*TIME + " ßjCOUNTRYj + ! 
(3) Two-period model: Adj. R2 = ß0 + ß1PART + ß2POST94 + ß3PART*POST94 + " ßjCOUNTRYj + !. 
PART is one of the six (binary or continuous) country-level institutional and macroeconomic partitioning variables 
described in Table 1. TIME takes on the values of 1 through 28 for the sample years 1981 to 2008, respectively. 
POST94 is a binary indicator set equal to zero in the years 1981 to 1994, and one in the years 1995 to 2008. 
COUNTRY is a vector of country fixed effects (coefficients not tabulated). For details on the market and accounting 
measures see Table 2. In Panel A, I report results from a single pooled time-series and cross-sectional regression of 
the balance sheet relation fully interacted with PART. The t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by country and year. Panel B reports results from estimating the linear trend or two-period model, 
again fully interacted with PART. The adjusted R2s from 807 country-year regressions of the balance sheet relation 
serve as the dependent variable. The t-statistics (in parentheses) account for within country cross-sectional and 
temporal dependence (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). The panel also reports p-values from F-tests comparing 
coefficients. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed). 
 
